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 Of Judges, Law, and the River:  Tacit 
Knowledge and the Judicial Role 
CHAD M. OLDFATHER* 
“I preach the neglected beauty of the obvious.” 
       -Karl Llewellyn 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay arises out of a conference panel charged with answering the ques-
tion “What does it mean to be a judge?”  That’s a tall order, and one is tempted to 
begin—and perhaps to end—by formulating taxonomy of characteristics that 
judges ought to have.  Indeed, that is a tactic that others have used.  The resulting 
lists differ in their particulars, but are broadly similar.  The enumerated traits in-




I do not dispute the value of the traits that tend to end up on such lists, and it 
is hard to quarrel with them as qualities that judges ought to possess.  But the 
exercise is of limited utility, because the characteristics are typically offered at 
such a high level of generality as to provide no meaningful guidance.  We all fa-
vor intelligent judges,
2
 just as we all favor, say, freedom.  But when we drill down 
more deeply we discover that this agreement masks differing conceptions of what 
intelligence, or freedom, or some similarly general concept means.  Of course, one 
solution would be to attempt to define more precisely what any of these concepts 
mean, or ought to mean.  But it may be that greater precision would not be desira-
ble even if it is potentially possible to achieve, and that what is desirable instead is 
having a bench that reflects a plurality of approaches. 
I am going to take the analysis in a somewhat different direction.  This analy-
sis is best set up with a story related by Karl Llewellyn in his masterwork The 
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals.
3
 As Llewellyn tells it, President Roo-
sevelt appointed a large number of legal academics to the circuit courts, including 
a number of Llewellyn’s close friends.4  And so Llewellyn asked them to make 
notes of how they decided their cases:  “Do it this first year; by the second year it 
will just be happening without your noticing, the way it does with all the others.  
The notes may not mean anything to you, but they will to me; I am outside.  You 
                                                          
*   Professor, Marquette University Law School.  
1.  See Andrew J. Wistrich, Defining Good Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKING 249 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds. 2010); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The 
Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 273, 285 (2002). 
 2. With the occasional exception, most often embodied by Senator Roman Hruska’s defense of the 
nomination of G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court:  “Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot 
of mediocre judges and people and lawyers.  They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and 
a little chance?”  Cong. Rec., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 7498 (1970). 
 3. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
 4. Id. at 264. 
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may not have time to study them, but I will.  And if they come from enough of 
you folks, we are going to find enough patterns to make sense.”5  Seven agreed to 
his request.  Yet he received not even a single note.
6
 
Judge Henry Friendly was not surprised.
7
  Friendly directs the reader to an-
other part of Llewellyn’s book, where Llewellyn quotes William James for the 
proposition that “the completed decision wipes off memory’s slate most of the 
process of its attainment.”8  The judges may have reached the end of their deci-
sional processes and found that they had little to say.
9
  But Friendly offers more.  
“A further reason is that the new judge soon learns that each judge judges differ-
ently from every other judge and that any one judge judges differently in each 
case.”10  Even if there is something to say, then, it may not be possible to general-
ize from one case to the next.  Judge Andrew Wistrich develops this point, cau-
tioning against a focus limited to the characteristics of a good judge on the 
grounds that such an approach overlooks the influence of the context and envi-
ronment in which decisions are made.
11
  Focusing on the characteristics of judges, 
and on the internal processes by which they make their decisions, may be to over-
look important situational and institutional factors. 
There is another lesson to draw from Llewellyn’s story, which is more-or-less 
the one that Llewellyn himself draws.  It is that much of what goes into the pro-
cess of decision-making is inarticulable.  The problem is not so much that the 
process itself is self-erasing, or that it varies too much from one case to the next, 
but that it has, at its core, elements that are indescribable.  Newcomers to the craft 
are likely to find description particularly difficult,
12
 but the problem remains even 
for the veteran.  This is not to suggest that judges cannot provide a reasoned justi-
fication for their decisions—that is a different matter—but simply that the ability 
to provide an after-the-fact justification that situates a decision within the relevant 
legal materials and justifies it by reference to those materials does not mean that 
judges can accurately or adequately identify, in any sort of precise way, the steps 
they undertook in making the decision. 
This essay builds on the preceding observations, namely that judging is a con-
text-driven activity, and one that draws to a great degree on processes not fully 
articulable.  Those observations in turn highlight a central challenge facing those 
responsible for the design and maintenance of judicial institutions (including the 
education of judges).  Appreciating that challenge requires the acceptance of three 
largely uncontroversial propositions.  The first is that the law affords a great deal 
of discretion to judges.  Sometimes this is by design, and sometimes it is a product 
                                                          
 5. Id. at 265. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961). 
 8. Id. at 229. 
 9. For a general treatment of the phenomenon, see Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Judicial Over-
stating, 88 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 10. Id.  Judge Michael Boudin extols Friendly’s virtues as a judge, but then notes:  “Other judges, 
including very fine ones, have done the job differently: Brandeis as a justice was an impassioned 
advocate; Black, a unique mixture of populist sentiment and (at least in his own mind) literal construc-
tion.  Wisdom and Tuttle, heroic judges immersed in civil rights litigation, were sometimes part of the 
struggle and not above it.”  Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010). 
 11. See Wistrich, supra note 1. 
 12. LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 265-66. 
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss1/9
No. 1] Of Judges, Law, and the River 157 
of the inherent underdeterminacy
13
 of much law.  The second is that in exercising 
this discretion judges are susceptible to an array of unconscious influences often 
regarded as illegitimate, and that if unchecked threaten to undermine the rule of 
law.  The third is that the inarticulable nature of judicial decision-making means 
that good judging necessarily entails drawing on another sort of unconscious in-
fluence—in this case, one that we want to celebrate and cultivate.  The challenge 
thus stems from the need to give play to some unconscious influences but not 
others, and it is complicated by the fact that the line between legitimate and ille-
gitimate influences is both blurry and contestable. 
I.  JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE IT 
As Professor Maurice Rosenberg noted in opening one of the earliest and best 
academic discussions of discretion: 
To speak of discretion in relation to law is to open a thousand doorways 
to discussion.  The concept is pervasive and protean, with intimations of 
both power and responsibility.  Even when confined to judicial settings, 
it manifests itself in numberless ways.  Whatever the court, wherever it 
sits, the judge soon finds himself talking, wondering and, at times, think-
ing about discretion and its implications.
14
 
A.  The Sources of Judicial Discretion 
The discretion afforded judges emerges from two primary sources.  The first 
involves express grants.
15
  This sort of discretion is perhaps most obvious in the 
case of trial courts, in which judges exercise a vast amount of discretion ranging 
from how they manage their courtrooms, to whether a piece of evidence is admis-
sible, to sentencing, and so on.  For most of these tasks, we recognize that it would 
be either impossible or undesirable to attempt to mandate particulars.  There are 
too many ways in which cases differ from one another, and one size very clearly 
does not fit all.  Express grants of discretion are less apparent in appellate courts, 
but present nonetheless.  Courts of last resort often possess discretionary jurisdic-
tion, pursuant to which they exercise almost unfettered control over the content of 
their dockets.  But even more mundane aspects of appellate review contemplate 
the exercise of discretion in their implementation.  Consider, for example, harm-
less-error review.  The process of assessing the impact of a trial judge’s error is 
every bit as context-dependent as a trial judge’s determination whether a given 
piece of evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by risk of unfair 
prejudice. 
The second source of discretion is the underdeterminacy of law.  The saying 
has it that “we are all Realists now.”  Simply put, no law maker acting at Time 
1—whether it be legislature, court, or administrative agency—can fully specify 
                                                          
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYR. L. REV. 
635, 635 (1971). 
 15. Rosenberg further subdivides this kind of discretion into its primary and secondary versions.  
See id. at 637. 
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the content of the law, whether due to limits of language, limits of foresight, or 
both.  This means that a court acting at Time 2 will necessarily have room in 
which to exercise judgment either in determining what the law is or how it applies 
to the facts of a given case.  Judge Posner has dubbed this the “open area,” and 
noted that judges enjoy an involuntary freedom resulting from the inability of 
formal legal standards to determine outcomes in all cases:  “That inability, and 
that difficulty or impossibility, create an open area in which judges have decision-
al discretion—a blank slate on which to inscribe their decisions—rather than be-
ing compelled to a particular decision by ‘the law.’”16 
B.  Corrupting Influences 
Wherever there is discretion, there is potential for it to be exercised in ways 
that are inconsistent with the purposes that led to its granting.  Sometimes this 
happens in ways that involve clear failures of process, such as where a judge 
simply neglects to account for some required component of the analysis.  But it 
can also result from unconscious influences, and recent decades have witnessed 
the development of considerable evidence that judicial decision-making is not 
immune from these effects. 
The existence of these influences is well established.  Political scientists took 
the lead in demonstrating that judicial decision-making is correlated with ideolo-
gy.
17
  In similar fashion, psychologists have demonstrated that human decision-
making in general is afflicted by various biases that lead to systematic and pre-
dictable departures from rationality.
18
  A growing body of research demonstrates 
that judges, too, are susceptible to these influences.
19
  Much work remains to be 
done to refine these basic insights, and to identify the nature of the causal mecha-
nisms at work.  The important point for the purposes of this article is simply that 
judicial behavior, like human behavior more generally, departs from both pure 
rationality and from the sort of ideology-free objectivity that we might posit as the 
ideal. 
As this characterization suggests, the implicit assumption in many discussions 
of unconscious influences on judicial behavior is that such influences are undesir-
able.  The cynical take would be that this research simply confirms that law is 
merely politics and we ought not pretend otherwise.  But for most people the re-
sults seem to be regrettable and the sort of thing we should strive to overcome 
through judicial education, procedural and institutional design, and otherwise. 
C.  Contributing Influences 
A focus on the sorts of influences just discussed creates a danger of reflexive-
ly regarding unconscious influences on judicial behavior as pernicious.  If we do 
so, however, we risk overlooking the basic point that judging necessarily—and 
desirably—draws on influences that are unconscious in the sense that they are 
                                                          
 16. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008). 
 17. E.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisit-
ed 433 (2002). 
 18. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 19. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
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inarticulable.
20
  Indeed, we might say more generally that doing the work of law 
often entails resorting to such influences.
21
  The phrase I will use to capture the 
idea comes from philosopher Michael Polanyi, who wrote of what he called “tacit 
knowledge.”  Polanyi most famously encapsulated the idea in the phrase “we 
know more than we can tell.”22  Stated somewhat generally, the idea is that there 
are certain sorts of tasks the doing of which cannot be described in words.  Po-
lanyi’s most famous example is of riding a bicycle—something that most people 
know how to do, but which almost no one can explain.
23
  Polanyi wrote: 
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by pre-
scription, since no prescription for it exists.  It can be passed on only by 
example from master to apprentice. . . . 
To learn by example is to submit to authority.  You follow your master 
because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot ana-
lyse and account in detail for its effectiveness.  By watching the master 
and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice 
unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not 
explicitly known to the master himself. . . . 
In effect, to the extent to which our intelligence falls short of the ideal of 
precise formalization, we act and see by the light of unspecifiable 
knowledge and must acknowledge that we accept the verdict of our per-
sonal appraisal, be it at first hand by relying on our own judgment, or at 
second hand by submitting to the authority of a personal example as car-
rier of a tradition.
24
 
This sort of analysis, Polanyi further contended, extends to instances of “con-
noisseurship,” which includes not only tasks, such as wine tasting, that we would 
ordinarily think of as the traditional domain of connoisseurs, but also to tasks like 
medical diagnosis.
25
  Polanyi himself drew the connection to common-law judg-
ing:  “In deciding a case today the Courts will follow the example of other courts 
which have decided similar cases in the past, for in these actions they see embod-
ied the rules of law.  This procedure recognizes the principle of all traditionalism 
that practical wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed in rules of 
action.”26 
Polanyi’s phrase has not appeared widely in the legal literature.  Related ide-
as, however, have surfaced in a number of places.  In The Bramble Bush, Karl 
Llewellyn put it as follows: 
                                                          
 20. See generally Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1996). 
 21. Gewirtz describes his main point as follows:  “Law is not all reasoning and analysis—it is also 
emotion and judgment and intuition and rhetoric.  It includes knowledge that cannot always be ex-
plained, but that is no less valid for that.”  Id. at 1044. 
 22. MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (2009). 
 23. MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 49-50, 88 (1962). 
 24. Id. 53. 
 25. Id. at 54. 
 26. Id. 
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We have discovered in our teaching of the law that general propositions 
are empty.  We have discovered that students who come eager to learn 
the rules and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take 
away the shell and not the substance.  We have discovered that rules 
alone, mere forms of words, are worthless.  We have learned that the 
concrete instance, the heaping up of concrete instances, is necessary in 
order to make any general proposition, be it rule of law or any other, 
mean anything at all.  Without the concrete instances the general proposi-
tion is baggage, impedimenta, stuff about the feet.  It not only does not 
help.  It hinders.
27
 
Three decades later, in The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals,
28
 
Llewellyn spoke of the need for judges to resort to “horse sense” and “situation 
sense.”  Llewellyn described “horse sense” to mean “neither the sense of a horse 
nor ordinary common sense, but that extraordinary and uncommon kind of experi-
ence, sense, and intuition which was characteristic of an old-fashioned skilled 
horse trader in his dealings either with horses or with other horse traders.”29  By 
“situation sense” Llewellyn meant the ability to recognize that what at first ap-
pears to be a novel situation actually fits within a familiar type.
30
  The idea can be 
found as well in the following nugget from Justice Holmes:  “I have long said 
there is no such thing as a hard case.  I am frightened weekly but always when you 
walk up to the lion and lay hold the hide comes off and the same old donkey of a 
question of law is underneath.”31 
Llewellyn and Holmes are not alone.  Thirty years before Llewellyn wrote 
The Common Law Tradition, Judge Joseph Hutcheson extolled the virtue of the 
“hunch” in judicial decision making:  “that intuitive flash of understanding which 
makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision.”32  More recent-
ly, Anthony Kronman wrote in The Lost Lawyer of the craft values involved in 
lawyering and judging, and of the role of practical wisdom and what he called 
“deliberative imagination” in judicial decision-making.33 
Each of these commentators recognizes that there is more to law than can be 
reduced to words, and that the verbal formulation of a legal rule often provides 
only a starting point, in which case an appropriate analysis must draw on the less 
tangible “senses” to which Llewellyn refers.  Cultivating those senses, and the 
ability to apply them to specific situations, requires long experience, in the law 
generally, and in the task of judicial decision making.  It requires the absorption of 
cultural norms and the acquisition of working knowhow, which of course can be 
only partially passed along via rules or principles.  Even then, as Llewellyn cau-
tions, “the rules not only fail to tell the full tale, taken literally they tell much of it 
                                                          
 27. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 2 (1930). 
 28. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 3. 
 29. Id. at 201. 
 30. Id. at 60. 
 31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. & FREDERICK POLLOCK, HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 155-56 (2d 
ed. 1961). 
 32. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the Hunch in Judicial Decision, 
14 CORNELL L. REV. 274, 893 (1929). 
 33. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 326-27 
(1993). 
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wrong,” and they can be put to proper use only via “ways and attitudes which are 
much more and better felt and done than they are said.”34  Sensitivity to these 
ways and attitudes can be developed only through sustained exposure to examples.  
It is the acquisition of a craft. 
II.  TRACING THE PROPER BOUNDS OF UNCONSCIOUS INFLUENCE 
We have seen that the nature of law is such that judges must exercise discre-
tion, sometimes by design, and sometimes because it can be no other way.  This 
exercise of discretion is subject to unconscious influences, and as the discussion in 
the preceding section suggests, those influences can be the product of improper 
factors, and thus the sort regarded as bad, or can be the product of the sort of tacit 
knowledge essential to the appropriate implementation of the bare framework 
provided by formal legal standards. 
This dichotomy suggests the existence of a line between the two types of in-
fluence; a separation between the bad and the good.  It also suggests an at least 
partial answer to the question:  “what does it mean to be a judge?”  Being a judge 
means following the articulable parts of law as far as one is able.  This will often 
be quite far, and will cover the resolution of most cases.  But being a judge also 
means recognizing that sometimes the articulable parts do not take one the entire 
way, in which case it becomes necessary to resort to intuition or situation sense or 
whatever one wants to call the inarticulable aspects of the role.  When that hap-
pens the judge must attempt to give weight to the appropriate types of uncon-
scious influence, while simultaneously minimizing, and ideally eliminating, the 
effects of undesirable sorts of influence. 
So described, this is a tall order for at least two reasons.  First, by definition a 
judge cannot be aware of unconscious influences on her decision-making.  Even if 
resorting to tacit knowledge is a conscious process, it is the sort that seems espe-
cially susceptible to being swayed by unconscious influences.  Second, there is the 
difficulty in determining when unconscious influences are good, versus when they 
are bad.  A judge who leans on the unconscious or ineffable in reaching a decision 
may achieve greater justice as a result, but he may also err in the other direction.  
And he will himself be unable to know. 
A.  The Example of Judging in Aesthetic Sport 
It is useful in appreciating the point to consider judging in a different context.  
Certain sports such as gymnastics and figure skating—the kind philosophers of 
sport call “aesthetic sports”35—are scored via an official’s assessment of the quali-
ty of an athlete’s performance.  To an even greater degree than in law, the judges 
in these sports must apply underdeterminate standards in fulfilling their role.  For 
example, among the standards figure skating judges must apply are those calling 
                                                          
 34. LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 214. 
 35. See GRAHAM MCFEE, SPORT, RULES, AND VALUES: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
NATURE OF SPORT 90-91 (2004). 
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for the assessment of a given performance’s “flow and effortless glide” and 
“phrasing and form.”36 
To the outsider, those words are nearly meaningless.  To tell the non-skater, 
or even the novice skater, that she must gauge the extent to which a performance 
exhibits those characteristics is to give that person very little guidance.  The 
phrases gain meaning only when considered in conjunction with a base of tacit 
knowledge, which here takes the form of an internalized sense of what the ideal 
skating performance would look like.
37
  That base of knowledge, like tacit 
knowledge more generally, can be acquired only through the gradual accumula-
tion of experience in and absorption of the relevant culture.
38
  Thus aspiring judg-
es in aesthetic sports have typically spent time as a participant in the sport, with 
the process of becoming a judge continuing through a period of apprenticeship 
from which candidates can graduate only if their assessments are sufficiently simi-
lar to those of longer-serving judges.
39
  Put differently, the aspiring judge must 
demonstrate that her internalized conception of the ideal performance is sufficient-
ly well-calibrated to that of existing judges in order to become a judge at all.  It is 
a classic process of acquiring tacit knowledge. 
The result of this process, when implemented throughout a sport, is that there 
exists, in a rough sense, a “right answer” to questions of judging, at least if we are 
willing to posit some best conception of the nature of the ideal performance.  Any 
given performance will stand a certain distance from the best conception, which 
makes it possible to judge that performance relative to both the ideal and to other 
performances.  But even if we conclude that such a best conception exists, there is 
no reason to think any given judge or panel of judges will have access to it.  The 
very nature of such a best conception is that it is likely to be a distillation of, or 
interpolation among, the notions of the idealized conception held by some collec-
tion of judges or participants in the sport, and thus not something that is held by 
any single person.  It is unlikely to match up precisely with any one person’s con-
ception of the ideal, but each person will necessarily regard her conception of the 
ideal as the appropriate version, for if she did not then she would be doing some-
thing other than applying the idealized version. 
A problem emerges in that the precise content of the performative ideal is in-
accessible (in varying degrees) to judges.  There is another difficulty.  Even were 
we to conclude that any given judge could draw upon the best conception of the 
ideal, we immediately face a similar problem in terms of assessing the individual 
performances to be measured against the ideal.  It is almost certainly beyond the 
limits of human cognition to be able to perceive, take into account, and hold in 
memory the various factors necessary to fully assess any given performance and 
then score it relative to the ideal.
40
  Because it is cognitively impossible for a 
                                                          
 36. For an overview, with links to more detailed information, see International Judging System 
(IJS), US FIGURE SKATING, http://www.usfsa.org/New_Judging.asp?id=289 (last visited May 25, 
2015). 
 37. Bernard Suits, Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport, 15 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 6 (1988). 
 38. POLANYI, supra note 23, at 53. 
 39. See Chad M. Oldfather, Of Umpires, Judges, and Metaphors: Adjudication in Aesthetic Sports 
and its Implications for Law, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 271 (2014). 
 40. Clare MacMahon & Bill Mildenhall, A Practical Perspective on Decision Making Influences in 
Sports Officiating, 7 INT’L J. SPORTS SCIENCE & COACHING 153, 154 (2012) (“Researchers have 
pointed out that the perceptual-cognitive tasks in officiating create demands that surpass human infor-
mation processing limits.”). 
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judge to mentally wield each of the criteria applicable to judging a performance, it 
becomes necessary for her to fall back on heuristics and intuition. 
Not surprisingly, research has revealed that all sorts of unconscious influ-
ences creep into the process.  It will come as no surprise to those who have even a 
passing familiarity with Olympic figure skating that judges manifest nationalistic 
and other forms of affiliation biases, pursuant to which judges favor skaters from 
their own country or, in more regional competitions, their own skating club.
41
  The 
same is true of reputation biases, which lead to skaters with strong reputations 
receiving, on average, higher scores than those without.
42
  Order biases lead to 
generally higher scores for skaters later in a sequence even if competition order is 
independent of scores in a prior round or some other measure of skill.
43
  It is clear, 
then, that unconscious pressures shape the behavior of judges in these sports.  
Judges necessarily draw on tacit knowledge in assessing performances, and it 
should hardly surprise us that this process of accessing inarticulable knowledge is 
influenced in these ways. 
What is less clear is whether all of these biases are as “bad” as we might first 
imagine.  Some might turn out to be shortcomings, but of the sort we would re-
gard as less pernicious than they might first appear.  What seems to be the mani-
festation of a nationalistic bias, for example, might simply be a reflection of dif-
fering stylistic preferences.  It may be, in other words, that a judge whose scoring 
seems to reflect nationalistic biases is accurately assessing individual performanc-
es, but comparing them to an ideal differing in material respects from other judg-
es’.  Others may simply reflect judges’ efforts to make up for the cognitive defi-
cits that render them unable to accurately assess a given performance.  In other 
words, the influence of biases may be the product of an effort to fill in the infor-
mational gaps resulting from judges’ inability to take in all the pertinent infor-
mation.  Because they cannot see everything, they complete their knowledge by 
drawing upon the next-best available substitute.  Thus a judge who is influenced 
by a skater’s reputation could be characterized as acting illegitimately, but could 
also be viewed as drawing on the same sense of the skating community (the one 
that gave rise to the reputation) that is the source of the concept of the ideal per-
formance that is to be the benchmark.  While the resulting assessment may differ 
from the one that a perfectly informed judge would make, it would arguably be 
better than one for which the judge had to resort to some other form of proxy. 
                                                          
 41. See Cheryl Litman & Thomas Stratmann, Judging on Thin Ice: Affiliation Bias in Figure Skat-
ing, Working Paper, September 2013, available at https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/events/ 
Archive/conferences/2014/02/2014-02-28-event-ConfCESifo/Programme.html; John W. Emerson, 
Miki Seltzer & David Lin, Assessing Judging Bias: An Example from the 2000 Olympic Games, 63 
AM. STATISTICIAN 124 (2009); Eric Zitzewitz, Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons 
for Organizational Decision Making, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 67 (2006); Robert Whissell et 
al., National Bias in Judgments of Olympic-Level Skating, 77 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 355 
(1993). 
 42. Leanne C. Findlay & Diane M. Ste-Marie, A Reputation Bias in Figure Skating Judging, 26 J. 
SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCH. 154 (2004). 
 43. Iain Greenlees, et al., Order Effects in Sport: Examining the Impact of Order of Information on 
Attributions of Ability, 8 PSYCH. SPORT & EXPERTISE 477 (2007). 
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B.  Judges, Law, and the River 
A similar dynamic holds in the context of judging in law.  The socialization 
process is considerably more complex, and the standards that judges must apply 
are less consistently opaque, but there are plenty of situations in which judges 
must implement either expressly granted discretion or imprecise legal standards.  
In doing so they draw upon tacit knowledge.
44
  It is at least theoretically possible 
that there is a single correct answer to any of these legal questions.  But as is true 
with respect to judges in aesthetic sport, there are reasons to question whether any 
individual judge can reliably access that right answer. 
As noted above, judges’ exercise of discretion is subject to similar sorts of 
unconscious influences.  Just as we might not want to reflexively conclude that the 
operation of these sorts of influences in aesthetic sport is a bad thing, so, too, there 
might be ways in which what we initially perceive as biases in the law are actually 
reflections of legitimate differences in the way judges conceive of their jobs, or 
are instances of reliance on second-best information that, if ignored, might lead to 
even less-optimal decisions. 
Take the example of ideology.  Because law ultimately rests on politics, we 
might conclude that some political responsiveness by judges is not a bad thing.  
For example, one answer to Alexander Bickel’s complaint about the 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review is to show that judicial review is not 
fully countermajoritarian.
45
  This might be so because the political preferences of 
those who appoint judges continue to manifest themselves in those judges’ deci-
sion making.
46
  The point is probably even stronger in state systems in which 
judges are elected.  There we might imagine justifying an even larger role for the 
influence of politics. 
This is a large topic, and one that I mean simply to identify and not resolve.  
Part of the point is simply that reasonable minds will differ about the extent to 
which it is desirable to have politics influence judicial decision making, about the 
contexts and ways in which it might be appropriate for that influence to operate, 
and so on.  They will also differ over whether and when it is appropriate for judg-
es to rely on decisional heuristics departing from the narrow prescriptions of ra-
tionality.
47
  Just as in aesthetic sport, the boundary between proper and improper 
influence is fluid and contestable, and it is consequently difficult to say when a 
judge has crossed it. 
One answer to our question “what does it mean to be a judge,” then, is that it 
means being someone who must walk something of a tightrope—who must draw 
on the good parts of her tacit knowledge while avoiding the pitfalls associated 
with undesirable unconscious influences.  Because we are concerned here with 
processes that operate beneath the surface, there are limits to what a judge can do 
to balance these forces while deciding any given case.  Much of the necessary 
channeling of discretion must take place via mechanisms that operate more broad-
ly.  This brings us back to Judge Wistrich’s suggestion that we ought to pay more 
                                                          
 44. See supra Part I.C. 
 45. Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 333, 351 
(2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
 47. E.g., Gewirtz, supra note 20. 
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attention to context and circumstance.  Our focus must not be solely on the indi-
vidual judge deciding the individual case, but also on the cultural, institutional, 
and procedural contexts in which she works.  And we must keep an eye on chang-
es in those contexts. 
Three decades ago Paul Carrington wrote a short but influential essay called 
Of Law and the River.
48
  Carrington wrote in response to a then-recent controversy 
in legal education, but his discussion is pertinent here.  Carrington drew on Mark 
Twain’s Life on the Mississippi to draw a parallel between law and a river.  Twain 
wrote about his training as a steamboat pilot, and discussed the range of 
knowledge and depth of experience necessary to capably navigate a river.  He also 
noted that change was constant, and brought about the need for ongoing study of 
the river.  Pilots whose own boats were under repair would often travel on other 
boats simply to keep their knowledge current.
49
 
Carrington stands with Hutcheson, Llewellyn, and Kronman in regarding 
judgment and intuition—tacit knowledge—as a key component of being a lawyer 
or judge.
50
  Twain, he writes, “like law students . . . came only gradually to the full 
realization that his subject was elusive as well as complex, that no amount of 
sheer memorization of information would ever be enough to make him a good 
pilot.”51  “Twain knew that the technical knowledge and skill drilled into him . . . 
was not the durable substance he received.  Twain tells us that what he really 
learned . . . was not marks and channels, but judgment and courage—judgment in 
the evaluation of his own technical knowledge and skill, courage to apply them 
despite the ubiquitous risk of professional error.”52  This knowledge—tacit 
knowledge—is the ineffable byproduct of an accumulation of experience, which 
brings with it not only concrete, technical knowledge, but a feel for how the river, 
or the law, works. 
Change is constant in both the law and the river.
53
  Just as the river pilots in 
Twain’s day would accompany other pilots to keep their knowledge current, law-
yers and judges must engage in a constant process of learning and relearning that 
can come only through continuing engagement with the material. 
Here is where we encounter cause for concern, because there is reason to be-
lieve the context and circumstances in which judges perform their jobs have 
changed in ways that have negatively affected judges’ ability to engage in this sort 
of learning.  Once, or so it seems, judges had the luxury of time.  This provided 
the opportunity for digging into the caselaw and the record, for studying, for ob-
serving and perhaps even reflecting on changes in the river of law.  That time has 
passed, and the judicial role has become more managerial in nature.  Judges are 
perhaps now more often like the pilots riding along than like those actually navi-
gating the river, in the sense that it is others who are engaging more directly with 
the record and the caselaw.  Law clerks now do much of the hands on work—the 
research, the review of the record, the drafting of opinions. 
                                                          
 48. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). 
 49. Id. at 225. 
 50. “But our work, like that of pilots, requires effective use of intuition going beyond technical 
knowledge; those who use intuition need to know its limits.  Thus lawyers like pilots must always be 
distrustful of themselves, on guard against the risk of mistaking their own political or social prefer-
ences for those of the law.”  Id. at 226. 
 51. Id. at 224. 
 52. Id. at 225. 
 53. Id. at 224. 
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Whether that change has led to erosion in the base of the tacit knowledge that 
judges must draw upon is an open question.  But one can reasonably hypothesize 
that contemporary judges’ more distant engagement with their work leads the 
judiciary collectively to be less tied to shared notions of what the law should be 
and how it should work.  Put in the language of aesthetic sport, we might imagine 
a less robust buy-in to the content of the performative ideal. 
CONCLUSION 
While the particulars of my analysis are in many respects both tentative and 
speculative, it is reasonable to conclude that judicial education has become more 
important than ever as a means for keeping judges up to date on the course of the 
river of law.  The participants in the conference for which this paper was prepared 
shared a wide range of wonderful, innovative approaches that can serve this end.  I 
am pleased to have been able to take part in the conversation, and I look forward 
to the development and implementation of these proposals. 
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